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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS P. SPRUNT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
RE:

SPRUNT vs. D & R G

Plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred
during plaintiff's regular course of employment as a
switchman for the defendant. The accident occurred on
tracks leading into and on property allegedly owned by
the Vitro Chemical Company in Salt Lake County, Utah.
The evidence showed that for a substantial period of
time the roadbed upon which plaintiff and the switch
crews of the defendant were required to walk was full
of holes averaging from a few inches to 8 and 10 inches
and occasionally 12 inches deep. That these holes were
caused by reason of the fact that the Vitro Chemical
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Company used. a clam shell and a bulldozer to maintain
the levelness of the roadbed and also to remove chemical
ore from the site of the roadbed. That the defendant
railroad made no effort to maintain or inspect these
premises upon which it sent its mnployees to perform
work.
The evidence showed that the unsafe condition had
existed for a substantial period of time, that the Union
had protested in September 1956, some four months before the accident to plaintiff, and again in December 1956,
approximately 3 weeks_ before the accident; that each
time promises .to correct these conditions were made by
officials of the defendant railroad but that no effort was
made by the railroad to maintain the roadbed in a level
condition and no actions were taken by the railroad to
make good its promises. The evidence further showed
that the plaintiff had knowledge of this irregular condition and that he had known of its defective condition for
1nany months prior to that day of his injury.
On the day that the plaintiff was injured the roadbed
was covered with snow and the holes and depressions and
irregularities in the roadbed were covered so that they
were not visible, although plaintiff had walked along the
roadbed and knew that holes were still there. \Vhile in
the process of mounting a ear which was a necessary act
and which he perforn1ed in the usual custmnary fashion,
one of plaintiff's feet slipped into a hole some 6 or 8
inches deep, he fell and suffered an injury resulting in
a 50% loss of the use of his left arm ~t the shoulder,
which damage and injury was the subject of the action.
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The undisputed testimony of the plaintiff was that
he did not know of the existence of the hole in which he
stepped prior to his fall and that the same was not visible
to him by reason of the fact that it was filled with snow.
No evidence was introduced to show that plaintiff should
have known of the hole unless it could be inferred from
his prior knowledge of the generally defective condition
of the area generally.
The jury found for the plaintiff but found that he
was guilty of contributory negligence and that he was
66-213 o/o responsible for his injuries.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 'TO THE JURY.
POINT II
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES IS INADEQUATE IN LAW.

Do the facts involved herein constitute contributory
negligence 1 It is necessary for some basic understanding
of the facts upon which contributory negligence can be
predicated.
The court by instruction 12 stated:
''You are instructed that you cannot infer
or find liability on the part of the railroad company from the mere fact that an injury took place.
Accidents do happen without negligence or liability on the part of either party to a suit. Therefore,
if you believe from the evidence in this case that
the occurrence, resulting in injuries to plaintiff,
was caused without negligence or fault on the
part of defendant, then your verdict must be in
favor of defendant, and 11gainst the plaintiff 'no
cause of action'.''
3
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As the instruction indicates, the fact that an accident
took place does not in and of itself prove either negligence or contributory negligence. It is not a one-way
street, although the defendant would have one take that
position. In other words, the carTier contends that the
mere fact that an injury occurred does not prove or tend
to prove or create any inference that the Company was
negligent. On the other hand, the carrier contends that
it is permitted to argue the faet of contributory negligence from the n1ere fact that plaintiff sustained an inJUry.

This obviously is incorrect. The Court in Williams
v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., Utah 1951, 230 P2 316, quotes
with approval an instruction of the trial court in part
as follows at page 323:
'' * * *To establish the defense of contributory negligence the burden is upon the defendant
to prove, by a preponder.ance of evidence, that
the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence contributed in smne degree as a. proximate
cause of the injury.''
By a preponderance of the evidence n1eans a substantial evidence. A jury may not ~onjecture or speculate
but must have substantial evidence upon which to base a
verdict. (Anderson v. N1~:ron, Utah, 1943, 139 P2d 216)
The above view was reaffinned in Alvarado l:.
Tucker, Utah, 1954, 268 P2d 986, ·wherein Justice Crockett speaking for the Court relative to the problen1 of
burden of proof states at page 988:
'' (3,6) The burden was upon plaintiff to
4
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prove the charge of speeding ; such a finding of
fact could not be based on mere speculation or
conjecture, but only on .a preponderance of the
evidence. This means the greater weight of the
evidence, or as someti1nes stated, such degree of
proof that the greater probability of truth lies
therein. A choice of probabilities does not meet
this requirement. It creates only a basis for conjecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot
stand."
It has been established without any question that
the mere fact that plaintiff fell does not establish contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It was
established without debate that plaintiff did not know of
the existence of the hole in which he stepped and fell
prior to stepping into it. This, of course, relates only
to the problem of actual knowledge. Did he have constructive knowledge of the existence of this hole~ This
requires a review of the evidence. The evidence relating
to this is proof and is as set forth below.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 'TO THE JURY.

The testimony for the plaintiff indicated that the
area in which the plaintiff was compelled to work was in
deplorable condition, exceptionally rough, full of holes,
goudge markes and other rough areas and constituted a hazaradous condition. This condition had existed for
some months prior to this injury (Tr. 105 ). On September 26, officials of the Switchman's Union took the de5
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fendant 's Safety Engineer to the property to show him
and at that time the area was impassable by foot (Tr.
105, 106, 112, 114).
Conversations were had between Mr. S1nith and Mr.
Griffith, Assistant Superintendent, as late as the 27th
day of December, relative to correcting this difficulty,
however, nothing was done. Promises were made relative
to correcting these difficulties which were never complied
with. The only testimony as to the manner in which the
plaintiff was injured and his knowledge of these conditions come from the witness, Mr. Patterson, and plaintiff
himself, and is as follows:
MR. PATTERSON:

(Page 15, 16, lines 28 to 30, line 1)

Q.

Now, Mr. Patterson, what, if anything, did
the Vitro Uranium maintain between this
new spur switch and the hopper spur switch
at this time~
A. Under the condition they didn't maintain any
of them.
(Page 20, line 6-8)
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) ~Ir. Patterson, what
was the weather that day~
A. Well, there was snow on the ground, as I
recall, it was snowing just a little bit at the
time.
(By Mr. Patterson, page 2:2, lines 1 to :22)
Q. Now, you had had occasion to walk in that
area earlier also that day, hadn't you~
A. Yes sir, when I coupled the air hoses on the
cars.
Q. Tell the jury if you will the condition of that
road bed in that area?
6
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A.

Well, it was very rough-holes, mounds, there
was enough snow on the ground that made
it hard to detect the holes filled with snow and
it was generally in a very poor condition.
Q. Now, how long had it been in that condition
to your knowledge~
A. It had been in that condition for a long time,
we had complained to the company.
MR. ASHTON: Just a minute, may we have
stricken the last part, it is not responsive. We
would like to have the foundation laid so we can
meet that particular testimony.
THE COURT: It may be stricken.
Q. (By l\1r. Patterson) You say for a long time,
can you tell me in terms of months how long~
A. I know it was five or six months because we
had the safety man on the Rio Grande system
come to the Vitro and inspect it under our
complaints.
:MR. SPRUNT: (Page 42, lines 2 to 30; page 43, lines 1
to 7)

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

(By nir. Patterson) You say you were starting to mount the cars~
Yes.
Why would you do that~
When you are shoving through that place
where the hopper is, there is a shed there,
when you get inside that shed the engineer
can't see inside the shed, I was going to ride
the cars up so when M·r. Patterson got on
through I could stop the head car at the hopper.
You could walk two miles an hours~
Yes, as a general rule we always climb it
because the engineer couldn't see me where

7
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I was at and I could pass signals to Mr.
Patterson.
Q. In other words, it was necessary for you to
climb on the car~
A. Yes sir.
MR. ASHTON: I object, the court please,
it is calling for a conclusion.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled,
the answer may stand.
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) Now, what happened
when you-describe how you started to mount
the car, what you did~
A. Well, as a general rule when you are switching on a lead, or anything, we most generally
hit the stirrup with our right foot and most
generally reach up with the one hand, get hold
of the grab iron and follow up with the other,
when I went to follow up I slipped in the
meantime, and I couldn't get the grab iron.
Q. Why did you slip~
A. I stepped in a hole.
Q. Will you describe that hole to the jury,
please~

A.

Well, as far as I ren1ember, it was a hole
along side the cars where we walked, 1nade
by the clam shovel cleaning up the ore.
Q. Describe the hole itself as much as you can~
A. I would say the hole was around between
eight and twelve inches deep.
(Page 49, lines 9 to 26)
Q. (By 1\lr. Patterson) "\Vill you describe the
condition of the roadbed in the area between
this new spur switch and the hopper spur
switch, particularly at the tune that you sustained your injury~

8
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A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Well, I will say it was awfully rough, it was
full of holes from where the clam shell had
picked up the ore they had dumped from the
cars, they couldn't get all the ore out of there.
How long had this condition existed prior to
this to your knowledge~
I would say around six n1onths at least.
Now, what was the weather that day?
It had been snowing--it was snowing.
And could you see th(~Se holes~
No sir.
Why~

Because it had snowed all night and a lot of
the holes was filled with snow.
(Cross Examination by Mr. Ashton, page 57, lines
24 to 30; page 58, lines 1 to 14)
Q. You have, of course, a large area you can
choose to board this car~
A. That is right.
Q. You didn't have to get on, did you, at this
particular point~
A. No, I didn't have to.
Q. These cars are moving two to three miles an
hour and you could have, if you elected to,
to walk along there~
A. I don't know I could have walked that fast
there the way the roadbed was.
Q. You elected to get on the car at this particular
point?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You chose at this particular point to get on
the car~
A. That is right.
9
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Q. This was broad daylight~
A. Yes sir.
Q. You were aware of the fact where cars were
unloaded and the clam shell worked and would
make gouges, and were aware of the fact
snow had fallen and concealed rough spots
under the snow, you were aware of that?
A. Yes.
(Page 59, lines 5 to 30; page 60, lines 1 to 3)
Q. Mr. Sprunt, I am not trying to get you, in detailing the matter to relate what each muscle
did in this particular tme. When you reached
up, what was the usual way to do it, put the
weight on one hand f
A. Most generally put the weight on both hands.
Q. You reached with the left hand, and hadn't
got your weight up~
A. No sir.
Q. You were walking when this occurred 1
A. No.
Q. You were standing still f
A. Yes.
Q. So you were standing still when the car came
past going about two or three miles an hour,
and you reached up ·with your left hand~
A. Yes sir, that is right.
Q. Were you standing in a hole'
A. No I wasn't.
Q. Did you n1ove your feet before you got
aboard~

A. That is son1ething I can't say.
Q. As you reached with your left hand, as you
started to board, your foot went in a hole~
A. No, generally when you are boarding a car
you swing yourself on, when I went to swing

10
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on I slipped.
Q. When you swung to go on to board you stepped, do you know which foot~
A. No sir.
Q. You slipped with your foot in a hole1
A. Yes sir.
(Page 92, lines 26-30; page 93, lines 1-3)
Q. (By l\1r. Patterson) \Vas there any difference in the condition of the roadbed after the
visit you have mentioned~
A. No sir.
Q. Did they cease to have these holes In the
roadbed~

A. What is that~
Q. Did they cease to have holes in the roadbed
after these officials had been there~
A. No.
Mr. Hayden and Mr. Smith testified as follows as
to visits to the premises with officials of the defendant
and conversations relative thereto :
MR. HAYDEN: (Page 104, lines 14-30, page 105, lines
1-24)
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) Did you have occasion
during that period of time to contact an official of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad
relative to the premises~
A. Yes.
MR. ASHTON: Excuse me, Mr. Patterson,
let me have that time.
MR. PATTERSON: In September.
MR. ASHTON: In September ofMR. PATTERSON: 1956.
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) When was that'
11
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A. That was, I believe on the 27th.
Q. Of what¥
A. Of September in '56.
Q. Now, whom did you contact~
A. Mr. Pete Ackermann.
Q. Who is he?
A. He was the assistant superintendent of safety.
Q. For whom?
A. By the Denver and Rio Grande.
Q. And why did you contact him~
A. Because I was a member of the safety committee and we knew that a hazardous condition existed at Vitro Chemical Company.
Q. A hazardous condition relative to what?
A. Relative to footing along the trackage.
Q. And what did you and Mr. Ackermann do¥
A. Well, we were on a tour of the Roper yards
and we proceeded to Yitro Chemical, that we
found the conditions so bad there that we:MR. ASHTON: ~fay we have the witnes~
testify what he saw rather than characterize it.
THE COURT: It is not proper to draw your
own opinions, that is the duty of the jury. Tell
what you saw.
A. We saw holes along the trackage, which were
water and mud, and we proceeded to a point
which was impossible on foot.
Q. And then what did you do"?
A. We turned around and carne back off the
property.
Q. And what, if anything, did ~[r. Ackermann
say about this situation at that time, or subsequent to that time~
A. Mr. Ackermann said that he would have the

12
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condition taken care of.
MR. SMITH : (Page 113, lines 9 to 15)
Q. (By :Mr. Patterson) Did you and Mr. Ackermann and Mr. Hayden go out to that property~

A Yes sir.
Q. What did you discover when you went out
there~

A.

Well, the conditions were such we went up as
far as we could go in our oxfords and had to
truck from that point and he told us the conditions would be corrected.
From the above, it will be seen that the only basis
upon which actual or constructive knowledge of
the existence of the hole could be imputed to the
plaintiff would be on the basis he knew for a period of
six months that the area upon which he was compelled
to work was dangerous, defective and unsafe. Is this
sufficient~

The question answers itself in that this does not
constitute negligence but on the contrary is a form of
assumption of risk which had been outlawed by the 1939
amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C.A. Sec. 54.
This problem as to what constitutes assumption of
risk, which is outlawed by statute, and what constitutes
contributory negligence on the part of an employee is a
difficult close question. However, an examination of the
law prior to 1939 and the law subsequent to 1939 discloses a very interesting fact, namely, that the facts in
issue have always been held to be facts constituting the
13
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defense of assumption of risk.
Thus, in Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Roe, Okla.
1919, 180 P. 371, the Court held that a switchman having
knowledge of the rough and uneven condition of a track
assumed the risk of the derailment which was caused
by the defective condition of the roadbed.
In Edwards v. Southern Rai,Zroad Co., Ga., 184 S.E.
370, the Court held as a matter of law that an experienced
switchman assumed the risk of injury from soft uneven
dirt and gravel alongside the track, that he also assumed
the risk of broken, rotten and uneven cross ties as well
as the absence of ballast between the cross ties at a place
where a switchman attempted to mount an engine.
It will be observed that the facts in this case are
almost precisely the facts involved in the case at bar.
In Lehi Valley Railroad Co. v. Hatmaker, Pa., 69
F.2d 282, a railroad switchman who slipped and fell injuring his knee while closing a switch was held not to
be entitled to recovery because he assun1ed the risk of
injury from frost, grease and dirt on the ties by reason
of the fact that he had knowledge thereof, and in addition
had knowledge of the defective condition of the ground
below the ties.
Finally, the Supre1ne Court of the lTnited States
upheld this conclusion in Delaware L. & W. RR v. Koske,
49 S. C. 202, 279 U. S. 7. There, a switchman who had
worked for years in a yard stepped into an open ditch
and fell while in the process of jumping from a locomo-
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tive. The Supre1ne Court held that he had assumed the
risk of this condition and could not recover.
In all of these cases the question was not the question
of the negligence of the employee which would only mitigate dmnages, but that of an absolute defense to any
damages on the basis of assumption of risk, and uniformly under the facts at bar, as the preceding cases set forth,
the defense was found to be good as a matter of law.
In the year 1939 the Congress of the United States
enacted provision of the Court now known as Title 45
U.S.C.A. Section 54, which legislatively abolished the
doctrine of assumption of risk. In this case we now have
the carrier attempting to use the smne facts which formerly constituted the defense of assumption of risk but
which they now call contributory negligence. The question is, can that be done~
It is submitted that the Supren1e Court of the United
States in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 318
U.S. 54, 87 L.Ed. 610, has answered this contention once
and for all. In the Tiller case the plaintiff's husband
was a policeman for the railroad who had the duty of
inspecting seals on cars while they were in the yard.
While so engaged in his employment the decedent was
struck and killed by an unlighted switch engine. Tiller
was using a flashlight to assist him in inspecting the seals
on the train which was moving slowly along one track

when he was suddenly hit and killed by the rear car of
another train which was moving in the opposite direction.
The railroad claimed that the plaintiff should not be

15
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permitted to recover because of his knowledge of conditions.

ar-

The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice Black, stated:
"We hold that every vestige of the doctrine
of assumption of risk was obliterated from the
law by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress,
by abolishing the defense of assumption of risk
in that statute, did not mean to leave open the
identical defense for the master by changing its
name to 'non-negligence.' As this Court said in
facing the hazy margin between negligence and
assumption of risk as involved in the Safety Appliance Act of (:March 2) 189H, 45 USCA §1, 'Unless great care be taken, the servant's right will
be sacrificed by simply charging him with a assumption of the risk under another name'; and
no such result can be permitted here."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the concurring opinion
pointed out the problmn, which is precisely the problem
which we have at bar, stating at page 620:
"The point is illustrated by two opinions of
Mr. Justice Holn1es. In Schlennner Y. Buffalo, R.
& P. R. Co. 205 US 1, 12, 13, 51 L ed 681, 686, 27 S
Ct 407, he called attention to the danger of relieving from liability for negligence by talking about
'assumption of risk'-a danger resulting from
the ambiguity of the phrase. 'Assu1nption of risk'
by an employee 1nay be a \Yay of expressing the
conclusion that he has been guilty of contributory
negligence. But an employee cannot be charged
with contributory negligence simply because he
'assumed the risk' ; the inquiry is, did his conduct
depart from that of a reasonably prudent em16
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ployee in his situation' As Mr. Justice Holmes
admonished us in the Schlemmer Case, 'unless
great care be taken, the servant's rights will be
sacrificed by simply charging him with assumption of the risk under another name.' "
That the amendment and the decision in the Tiller
case has resulted in a complete about face on this problem is illustrated by the case of Georgia 8. & F. RR Co.
v. Williamson, 65 S.E. 2d 44, in which the Supreme
Court of Georgia completely reversed Edwards v. Southern Railroad Co., supra. By reason of the Tiller decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia now held that a
switchman did not assume any risk of damage because
he continued to work in a railroad yard knowing that
loose coal and other debris was scattered about and that
he did not assume the risk of an injury sustained when
he stumbled on such debris and fell under a moving box
car.
Since the Tiller case there have been six Federal
Second decisions on this subject, the first of which is to be
found in Anderson v Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway
Co., 7th Circuit, Ill., 227 F. 2d 91. In this case the switchman brought an action for injuries sustained by reason
of a fall on ice in the railroad yards. The Court claimed
that the evidence showed no negligence on the part of
the carrier and upon the basis of the evidence that there
was no proof of any negligence, the Court found:
"Obviously, in the instant case, plaintiff at
the time he went to work had knowledge of the
icy condition of the yards, as did the defendant,
and being familiar with the situation could be
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held under the reasoning of Aeby to have taken
'the risk of known conditions and dangers.' However, unfortunately for defendant, the re.asoning
of the Aeby case has been definitely repudiated
by the Supreme Court in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87
L. Ed. 610. In that case the District Court allowed
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, which
was affirmed by the Court of Appe.als, 4 Cir., 128
F. 2d 420.
''The Supren1e Court in reversing stated, 318
U.S. at page 57, 63 S. Ct. at page 446: 'The Circuit
Court distinguished between assumption of risk
as a defense by employers against the consequence of their own negligence, and assumption of
risk as negating .any conclusion that negligence
existed at all.'
''That, in our view, is precisely what the
Supreme Court did in .Aeby. The Supreme Court
in Tiller, in response to the reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals, stated, 318 U.S. at page
58, 63 S. Ct. at page 446: '\Ye find it unnecessary
to consider whether there is any 1nerit in such a
conceptual distinction between aspects of assumption of risk which seem functionally so identical,
and hence we need not pause oYer the rases cited
by the Court below, all decided before the 1939
amendment, which treat assun1ption of risk sometimes as a defense to negligence, someti1nes as the
equivalent to non-negligence.'
"Following this state1nent the court cites in
a footnote the Aeby case .as one which had treated
assumption of risk 'as the equivalent of non-negligence.' The court on the same page continued:
'We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of
assumption of risk was obliterated from the law
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by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, by
abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in
that statute, did not mean to leave open the identical defense for the master by changing its name
to 'non-negligence.'''
Following this case is the one of Texas and Pacific
Railway Co. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257. The plaintiffs were
members of switch crew bound for the round house.
Their switch engine temporarily stopped pursuant to a
red light. At that time another switch engine attempted
to couple under the rear thereof without warning and at
an excessive speed. The defendant requested an instruction which reads as follows:
''Where an employee of a common carrier
by railroad operating in interstate commerce anticipates the risk resulting from the possible negligence of a fellow-employee, or should under
the circumstances anticipate such risk, and decides to chance that particular risk, he cannot recover for an injury resulting from such negligence. Therefore, if you find that complainant
anticipated, or should have anticipated, the impact resulting from the coupling attempt and
knew, or should have known, of the risk inherent
in such an attempt and chanced that risk your
verdict must be for the defendant.''
This instruction was refused by the trial court. The
railroad then appealed from a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs and based it's argument in part on the requested instructions given above The Court of Appeal
refused to buy the argument, stating:
''Specification 6 is that the trial court erred
in refusing to• give special charge 9 requested by
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the defendant. Appellant relies particularly upon
an expression in the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., supra, 318, U.S. at page 71, 63 S. Ct.
at page 453.
'' 'By sp(!cific provisions in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it has swept away assumption of risk as a defense once negligence is established. But it has left undisturbed the other meaning of assumption of risk, namely, that an employee injured as a consequence of being exposed
to a risk which the employer in the exercise of
due care could not avoid is not entitled to recover,
since the employer was not negligent. '
"If appellant's counsel had read the succeeding page of the concurring opinion, he would have
found the answer to his contention:
'' 'Assumption of risk as a defense where
there is negligence has been written out of the
Act. But assumption of risk, in the sense that the
employer is not liable for those risks which it
could not avoid in the observance of its duty of
care, has not been written out of the law. Because
of its ambiguity the phrase assumption of risk
is a hazardous legal tool. As .a 1neans of instructing a jury, it is bound to create confusion. It
should therefore be discarded.' 318 U.S. page 72,
63 S. Ct. at page 453. ''
Again it will be seen that the facts upon which the
defendant is now basing its defense of contributory negligence is not contributory negligence at all but oil the
contrary is the old doctrine of assumption of risk now
being reviewed under a different nan1e. This :Mr. Sprunt
cannot be held neligent because he might have anticipated
an injury because of the defective condition of the road
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and especially when the defects were obscured by snow.
In Johnson v Erie Railroad Co., N.Y. 236 F. 2d 352.
Plaintiff was injured while working in a railway car between two other cars standing on a spur track as a result
of an impact caused by a coupling, which coupling the
plaintiff alleged was without warning. From a judgement in favor of the defendant the plaintiff appealed and
the case was reversed and sent back for new trial in part
because of the court's confusing of the issues of negligence with that of assumption of risk, stating at page
356:
''In addition, we think the court stated the
issue of contributory negligence to the jury in such
terms that it might be thought that assumption of
the risk w.as a good defense, contrary to 45U.S.C.
A. § 54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. The relevant
portion of the charge was as follows:
" 'Now, as to the question of contributory
negligence, which has been talked about in this
case: Owen Johnson had been working part time
it is true, but he had been doing this job before.
Is there anything that he did at the time that contributed to it~ He knew what his condition was. He
testified that the slightest hang on this bone might
be an aggravation of this condition. He claims he
wasn't warned and that that violated their rule by
not warning him. But Del Guidice, his own witness, testfied that it was a normal coupling that
happened every night, and presumably every night
they didn't stop to warn him because it was so
gentle that nobody was pushed around. At least,
you will be entitled to infer that from the testimony of Del Guidice.'
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"From this it rnight have been thought that
it was permissible to infer that, because on other
occasions when the plaintiff was at work the locomotive crew did not warn the mail car occupants,
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of an unexpected coupling of normal force. The specific exception to this passage was well taken.''
If the injured employee here was entitled to a new trial
by reason of the Court's error, is Thomas Sprunt not
entitled to an equal consideration~ Is not 1\tfr. Sprunt's
knowledge of the condition the sole basis for the claim
of negligence ~
In Southern Railway Co. v. Welch, Tenn. 6th Circuit,
247 F. 2d 340, the evidence was that on the days of the
injury excessive grit, dirt and tar on the rails required
extra force to pull the rails into proper position. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a ruptured intervertebral
disc by reason of the fact that he was not given extra
men. The case was tried without a jury. The defendant
appealed, alleging that 'there was no evidence of any
negligence and in fact that the evidence showed that the
plaintiff had not asked for any assistance and as a consequence his action was barred. The court disposed of this
argument, stating at page 341:
"Defendant's second contention arises out of
the fact found by the District Court, that plaintiff
did not request additional help nor 1uake use of
the help available. It urges that these facts bar
recovery and require reYersal. These objections,
however, are based essentially on the doctrines
of assumption of risk and of contributory negligence. But, since the enacbnent of 1939, 45 F.S.C.
A. Section 51 et seq., 'every vestige of the doctrine
of assumption of risk' has been eliminated from
22
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 318 U.S.
54, 63 S. ·Ct. 444, 446, 87 L.Ed. 610. See also
Thompson v. Camp, 6 Cir., 163 F. 2d 396, 402,
which held that neither assumption of risk nor
contributory negligence is a bar under the present
Act."
On the basis of the evidence, the plaintiff was entitled to have the court give its requested instructions to
the effect that he was not guilty of any contributory
negligence.
It is true that the court instructed the jury that
assumption of risk was not a defense and that it further
instructed the jury that the burden of proving contributory negligence was on the defendant. However, it is
submitted that there was no evidence introduced showing
that the plaintiff's conduct in any way departed from
that of a reasonably prudent employee in his situation.
The defendant introduced no evidence to show that his
conduct was in any way different from any other employee. It did not attempt to show that the plaintiff did
anything in any fashion different from an ordinary prudent person. On the contrary, it argued that the fact
he was hurt should not have happened because he had
knowledge that there were holes in the roadbed and that
had he exercised ordinary care he would not have been
hurt, without attempting to show either that he knew or
should have known of the existence of a hole under the
snow in the area in which he was about to step. I should
like to recall again the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter

in the Tiller case :
23
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"'Assumption of risk' by an e1nployee may be
a way of expressing the conclusion that he has
been guilty of contributory negligence. But an
employee cannot be charged with contributory
negligence simply because he 'assumed the risk;'
the inquiry is, did his conduct depart from that
of a reasonably prudent employee in his situation~"

The defendant made no effort and introduced no
evidence in conformity with that requirement of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is submitted that
a result thereof the court erred in permitting the jury to
consider whether the facts at bar constituted contributory negligence, facts which have never been held to constitute negligence but which have always been held to
constitute the defense of assumption of risk.
Fortunately, the question has been categorically
answered by the Federal Courts. In the case of Williams
v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 190 F.2d 744, the railroad
attempted to claim that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence because the employee continued to
work in an area which he knew was defective by reason
of the negligence of his employer in failing to provide a
safe place to work. The Court ruled against the railroad
saying at page 748:
"Indeed, even though the employee may know
that the employer has been negligent in the furnishing of a safe place to work or necessary safety
equipment, the employee does not under this Act
assume the risks of such danger. Title 45 U.S.C.A.
§ 54-; Tiller, Exee, v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610.''
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Finally, in Thomas v. Union Railway Company, 6th
Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 18, the plaintiff slipped on grease
allegedly left on the round house floor. It was not argued
that the railroad was guilty of negligence in permitting
the grease to remain on the concrete. However, the Defendant contended that it should be exonerated from liability by reason of the fact that the employee knew that
this condition existed. The Court of Appeals reversed
a decision, a jury verdict for the defendant, saying at
pages 19 and 20 :
"(1,2) The trial court charged the jury that
the railroad was not liable for injuries sustained
from dangers that were obvious or as well known
to the injured party as to the railroad; and that
if the jury found from the evidence a dangerous
condition of the concrete floor near the foreman's
office, in the roundhouse or deficient lighting
facilities in that place, 'if such dangerous condition existed, was obvious, or as well known to the
plaintiff Thomas as to the railroad, the defendant
would not be liable for injury sustained from such
dangerous condition.' The foregoing charged the
employee with assumption of risk. This was error,
as 'every vertige of the doctrine of assumption of
risk was obliterated from the law (the Federal
Employers' Liability Act) by the 1939 amendment.' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 318
U.S. 54, 58, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446, 87 L. Ed. 610. Even
though the employee may know that the employer has been negligent in the furnishing of a safe
place to work, the employee does not, under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, assume the
risks of such danger. Williams v. Atlantic Coast
LineR. Co., 5 Cir., 190 F. 2d 744, 748."
This view finds complete acceptance in the Restate25
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ment of the Law of Torts which defines assumption of
risk at Section 893, page 344 as follows:
"The defense of assumption of risk is not
dependent upon the defendant's knowledge or belief as to the plaintiff's state of mind but depends
upon the plaintiff's risk to which he exposes himself."
Indeed, the illustration, No. 14, on page 351 could
almost use the language of Justice Frankfurter in the
Tiller case supra. This illustration provides at page 351
as follows:
"14. A is employed by 2 in a State in which
by statute it is provided that, 'in an action for
personal injuries caused by visible defects for
which an employer would be liable but for the defense of asumption of risk, the fact that the employee continues in the employment after he has
been informed of the danger shall not be an assumption of the risk of injury therefrmn.' He is
employed in a building at work in which it is necessary to use a rope ladder which, as A knows,
is dangerous because not fastened at the bottom.
He is hurt by falling frmn the ladder. A is entitled
to recover from B unless his fall is caused by his
failure to be reasonably alert and watchful of
his own safety in using the ladder."
It is obvious that the fact that the plaintiff Thomas
Sprunt knew and had known of the dangerous defective
condition of the roadbed upon which he was compelled to
work and knowing of the situation and recognizing the
risks to which he was exposed, does not render hi1n negligent but it does in fact constitute the defense of assmnption of risk-a defense which is not available to the defendant in this action and which cannot be used by him
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under the guise of contributory negligence to reduce in
whole or in part the damages to which the plaintiff is
entitled.
These facts are not sufficient to predicate a determination that Thomas Sprunt was two-thirds responsible
for his accident and consequent injury.
Is there any other facts or theories which added to
the above facts would give the defendant railroad any
comfort~ That the only suggestion is that is to be gained
comes from the suggestion that it was not necessary for
Mr. Sprunt to board the car at the precise place he did;
that he could in fact have selected some other place. The
statement that Mr. Sprunt could have selected another
place from which to mount the car must be considered in
light of the following circumstances. The switching operation was on the premises of the Vitro Uranium Company.
It was necessary for him to mount the car in order that
the engineer could see him when he was passing signals
so that what the plaintiff was doing was essential and a
necessary part of his job. The roadbed in the vicinity of
where plaintiff and other members of his switching crew
were working had been pitted and in a generally unsafe
condition for several months. In September, before the
accident to plaintiff, conditions were so bad that company
safety officials could not walk along that roadbed in oxfords. This was a general condition not a special condition. At the time plaintiff fell, it had been snowing and
the holes had filled with snow so that neither plaintiff
nor his fellow employees could tell precisely where the
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holes were located. No evidence was introduced to show
that plaintiff knew of the existence, of the hole ~t:n which
he stepped nor was any evidence introduced to indicate
that plaintiff knew or should have known that any other
place in the area would have been safer for plaintiff to
use as a boarding point except that provided by hindsight.
No evidence was introduced to show that there was
an area in the immediate vicinity or in the general vicinity that was free of holes and that would have provided
safe footing for the plaintiff. On the contrary, all of the
evidence indicated that no safe area did in fact exist.
Under these facts, does the fact that the plaintiff
could have mounted the car from an area other than that
from which he selected constitute negligence? The answer
to this of necessity is an unequivocable negative.
However, before going into an examination of what
the l~w is relative to choice, I should like to point out to
this Court the following items:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The defendant in its answer did not allege any
facts which raise this theor~~ of contributory
negligence.
Defendant at the pretrail did not mention this
theory.
The Defendant did not suggest to the trial
court any such theory.
The defendant did not subn1it any requested
instructions e1nbodying said theory.
The Court did not advise the jury as to the
elmnents necessary to find contributory negligence on the theory of an election.
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The rule as to choice is set down in the case of
Stricklin v. Rosemeyer, Calif., 142 P2d 953 wherein it
was alleged that a plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence because the plaintiff alighted from a parked
vehicle on the left side when in fact he could have opened
the door from the right side.
The court made a succinct statement as to the law
relative to choice as follows:
"The rule is accurately stated in 38 Am. Jr.
p. 873, as follows: 'One having a choice between
methods of doing an act which are equally available, who chooses the more dangerous of the
methods, is ordinarily deemed negligent, in the
absence of a showing of the existence of an emergency, sudden peril, or other circumstances justifying such choice. The fact that the less dangerous method takes longer and is inconvenient and
attended with difficulties furnishes no excuse for
knowingly encountering peril.' The exceptions to
the application of the rule are also noted, but no
one is pertinent here."
One of the requirements set forth in the rule is knowledge and one is not necessarily contributorily negligent
even though he or she chooses a way that was in fact less
safe. In Williams v. City of Hobba, N. Mex., 249 P. 2d
765, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was negligent because she admitted that she was familiar with a
dangerous condition of the sidewalk. The court stated the
question as follows :
"In treating the contention the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in
entering a place of known danger and in choosing
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to walk along the sidewalk rather than in the ad..
jacent street or other nearby streets, our inquiry
is not whether she actually chose the least safe
of the ways available to her, but whether she
failed to exercise that degree of care required
of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.''
The court stated the question as follows:
"In the present case we cannot say as a
matter of law that the plaintiff \vas guilty of contributory negligence in choosing to walk upon the
sidewalk, even though she was well aware of its
dangerous condition. It was the only sidewalk in
the neighborhood; the street it paralleled was
unlighted; neither that street nor the nearby
streets were paved and a recent rain had left them
muddy and wet; the plaintiff had used the walk
in safety many times before, as had other persons.
Under these circumstances minds might reasonably differ as to whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the choice she made, and
the question is, therefore, one for the jury."
The State of Utah has long recognized the problem
inherent in an election or choice as will be seen in Tuckett v. American Steam & Hand Laundry, 84 P. 500, and
in Stam v. Ogden Packi·ng & Provision Co., 177 P. 218.
As was stated in K aumaus v TFhite Star Gas & Ovl Co.,
Utah, 63 P. 2d 231, "The n1ere fact that the servant was
aware that he was exposing himself to danger does not
ntake him guilty of contributory negligence.··
There are two recent cases in Utah bearing directly
upon the problen1 of contributory negligence of a plaintiff involving an election. In Baker v. Decker, Vtah, 212
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P. 2d 679, the plaintiff, an elderly woman of 70 years of
age, fell while walking along a second story hallway in the
Roosevelt Apartments in Salt Lake City. The defendant
showed that there were three means that the plaintiff
could have used to depart from her apartment but that
she chose one where it was obvious repair work was being
done, that she saw on the floor of the hallway the folded
uneven canvas that the repairman had laid on the floor,
that notwithstanding previous knowledge on the part of
the plaintiff, she elected to pursue that particular route,
caught her heel on the fold or uneven part of the canvas
and fell. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant
appealed, alleging that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in pursuing the
course she took because there was a safer course readily
available. The court in disposing of this case quoted
with approval from 11! oore v. Miles, Utah, 158 P. 2d 676,
stating at page 682:
"In our decision in that case we quoted with
approval the following excerpt from the case of
Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 4
N.W. 2d 365, 366: 'It is well settled that mere
knowledge that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for
travel, is not sufficient to establish contributory
negligence though there is another way that is
safe and convenient, and to defeat recovery it
must appear that the traveler knew or as an
ordinarily cautious person should have known
that it was imprudent to use the walk."
The court then went on to deal with the problem
raised by the fact that it was conceded that the plaintiff
knew and saw the alleged hazard. The Court disposed of
31
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that problem by stating:
"Conceding that ·respondent saw the equipment in the hall, unless it was imprudent for her
to proceed along that course she was not bound
to take a safer way. The danger portrayed by
the manner in which the equipment was placed in
the hall was not so serious that plaintiff can be
charged with indiscretion or lack of due care in
not deviating from her usual course of exit from
the building."
Where does the defendant claim the evidence shows
the plaintiff knew or should have known that it was imprudent to attempt to board the car where he did 1
The view set forth in Baker v. Decker, supra found
approval again in Wold v. Ogden City, Utah, 258, P. 2d
453.
In the facts at bar, the evidence is clear that Sprunt
did not know of the existence of the hole in which he
stepped. There was no evidence to indicate that moving to
any other place would have been any safer, nor was
there any evidence to indicate that it was imprudent on
the part of Mr. Sprunt to attempt to board the car at
the place he did save as a matter of hindsight.
The Restaten1ent of the Law of Torts again
conclusively establishes that the plaintiff cannot be
held to have been guilty of contributory negligence
under these facts. And it states, at Section 893, page
346 as follows :

"* * * On the other hand where the defendant
had no right to act dangerously or to maintain
a dangerous condition after knowledge of it by the
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plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff choose to
subject himself to a known risk does not necessarily bar him fr01n recovery. * * * In all such
cases the risk has not been thrust upon him.
Either the defendant was negligent with respect
to the plaintiff in view of a situation in which
the plaintiff had properly placed himself, or the
defendant was otherwise tortious in creating a
situation in which it was necessary for the plaintiff to take such a risk in order to protect an interest of his own or that of a third person against
the consequences of the defendant's conduct.
"If, however, the plaintiff in making his
choice, adopts a course of conduct which would
not have been adopted by a reasonably prudent
man in the light of the alternative open to him,
he may be barred from recovery. This is a form of
contributory negligence which has been frequently
called 'voluntary assumption of risk'. This is an
application of the phrase made for convenience to
indicate a defense based upon the fact that the
plaintiff is aware of the risk and chooses to continue."
Illustration No. 5 is closest to the facts involved
herein and provides as follows at page 348:
"5. The A railroad company negligently permits a slippery substance to remain on the floor
in front of its ticket window. B, a traveler entering to purchase a ticket, which he has a right to do
as a member of the public, realizes that he cannot
avoid stepping on the substance if he is to purchase a ticket, but reasonably believes that with
care he can avoid slipping. Although he advances
with due care he nevertheless slips and is hurt.
B is entitled to recover damages from A."
From the above, it will be seen that there is no way
33
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on the basis of the evidence produced at this trial that
the plaintiff can be found guilty of contributory negligence. In the first place, it would be essential to find
that the plaintiff knew specifically of the danger he was
running and that he further knew of a safer course which
a reasonably prudent person would have selected to take.
Again, let us state that there is no evidence either that
there was a safer course or that if such a safer course
existed that the plaintiff knew of or should have known
of its existence. On the contrary, all of the evidence
negates any presumption that either a safer place or
safer method existed or that plaintiff knew of it. No evidence was introduced nor claimed to exist that discloses
any safer place. On the contrary, all the evidence demonstrates that this place was duplicated throughout the area
generally.
It is apparent that the evidence does not meet the
test required to submit the question of choice as a basis
for contributory negligence to a jury. Had the court been
requested to instruct the jury on this issue that the Court
would have been duty bound to refuse such an instruction.
It would appear, therefore, that the defendant is
left with a principle of law as its justification for a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff that 1s completely and totally unsupported by the
facts.
POINT II
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES IS INADEQUATE IN LAW.

This suit originated by reason of a personal injury
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sustained by the Plaintiff while in the employment of the
Defendant on the 4th day of January, 1957. Mr. Sprunt
received a tear of the rotorcuff of his left arm as a result
of a fall which occurred during the course of his employment. Although he had some previous injury, the orthopedic surgeon who treated him stated there was no causal
connection between any prior injury and the injury he
sustained on the 4th day of January. (Tr. 72, 73). Nor
did this injury in any way constitute an aggravation of
any pre-existing condition (Tr. 79). As a result of the
injury, the Plaintiff sustained a 50o/o loss of function
of the left arrn (Tr. 84) which disqualified him physically
from working as a switchman (Tr. 84). His disqualification is permanent (Tr. 84).
The jury found in favor of the Plaintiff and against
the Defendant and awarded damages in the sum of
$15,000.00. However, the jury further diminished the
amount recovered in the amount of $10,000.00 saying
that in effect that the negligence of the plaintiff was at
least two-thirds responsible for his injury.
At the time of Plaintiff's injury, he was employed as
a switchman at the rate of $20.30 per day. This amount
was stipulated as a daily rate of pay by the counsel for
the Defendant. Plaintiff had some thirty (30) years
senority and he had enough senority that he could have
worked five day per week (Tr. 48). After his release
from the doctor he made an effort to obtain other employment but has been unable to find any other than the
position of driving a cab ( Tr. 48). He commenced working in this job on January 25, 1958 and makes approxi35
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mately $90.00 per month at said employment.
No evidence was introduced by the Defendant to
indicate either that other employment was available to
the Plaintiff or that he could have earned at other employment an amount in excess of $90.00 per month.
As of the date of trial his loss of pay equalled
$6,432.00, which would have to be reduced by his earned
income as a taxi driver, leaving a loss of pay as of the
date of trial of $5,802.30. There was no evidence to indicate that he had any other difficulty with his health. He
had a life expectancy in excess of twenty years. Even
assuming that he would only work until the age of 65,
an annuity purchased at the date of the trial would cf)st
approximately $25,000.00, which together with his damages of the date of trial would mean that he would have
received a monetary loss in excess of $30,000.00. That
would be only a dollar and cents loss and include no
award for pain, suffering, embarrassment, humiliation,
the permanent injury sustained, or otherwise. For a jury
to find that he was only damaged in the amount of
$15,000.00 is absurd and can only mean a complete disregrd of the elements of dmnages set forth by the Court.
Counsel for the defendant argued that he could obtain
employment that would earn him in excess of $90.00
which he stated he was able to earn. However, the uncontradicted evidence \Yas that he had made search for
employment and was unable to obtain any other employnlent by reason of his age and that all he had been able
to earn was $90.00 per n1onth. The defendant argued
facts to the jury which \Yere not in evidence and the only
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explanation for the determination of the size of the award
must be that the jury considered the argument of counsel
as being facts rather than argument and that they disregarded the testimony or the lack of it.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Bodon v.
Suhrmann have adopted the position that it is within the
discretion of the trial court to increase a judgment
brought in by a jury, stating:
"We affirm the responsibility of this court
to be indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and
not to disturb it so long as it is within the bounds
of reason, in accordance 'With the principles set
forth in the companion case of Schneider v. Surhmann; and also that it is primarily the perogative
and duty of the trial court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and to order any necessary
modification thereof. Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it
should not be permitted to stand, and if the trial
court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to make the
correction on appeal."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff is
entitled to have a full judgment of $15,000.00 restored
to him by reason of the fact that there is no evidence in
the record that in any way justifies the finding of contributory negligence on the part of _Mr. Sprunt that in
any way contributed to or proximately caused his in-
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jury. It is further submitted that l\fr. Sprunt is entitled to have the amount of $15,000 increased by a
minimum of $10,000.00 or be granted a new trial by
reason of the fact that the total amount of damages
found by the jury were inadequate and unrealistic as a
matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PATTERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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